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Introduction 1
In May 2004, the first eight post-communist countries entered the European Union (EU). 1 January 2007 they were followed by Bulgaria and Romania. 2 The status as full members of the union could be seen as a verification of their democratic credentials and successful economic reforms. If these Central and East European countries have made substantial achievements in establishing relatively stable and functioning democracies, the same cannot be said for a majority of the post-Soviet states. In some of these countries (e.g. Belarus and
Turkmenistan), the development has been one of transition from one type of non-democratic regime to another. In other countries -for example Ukraine and Georgia -the postcommunist development has been characterised by both democratic progress and setbacks.
During the European integration process, the applicant countries have been judged mainly by their politico-institutional and macro-economic transformation to multi-party democracy and market economy. These factors have also come to dominate academic analyses of postcommunist transition and consolidation within political science.
This paper, however, argues that for stable and consolidated democracy, skilful institutional engineering and market economy is not enough. A democratic political regime also needs to enjoy popular support. Thus, the focus of our investigation will be on citizen support for democracy, i.e. the attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation.
Conceptualisations of attitudinal consolidation argue that for a democratic regime to be consolidated, democracy has to be considered the most appropriate -or the least bad -system of government by at least a majority of the people (cf. Linz & Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998; Linde 2004 ). In this study, then, attitudinal consolidation in terms of public regime support constitutes the dependent variable.
Drawing mainly on the New Europe Barometer -a large-scale cross-national survey -the paper sets out to analyse popular support for the political regime in thirteen post-communist countries -the eight Central and East European states that entered the EU in 2004, the new members Bulgaria and Romania, and the CIS countries Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Accordingly, it employs a broad comparative perspective, both in space and over time, which should provide a good opportunity to analyse variation in the dependent variable.
The countries included in the analysis could be considered to make up three clusters of countries. The first group consists of the eight post-communist EU member states that received full membership in 2004. Recent members Bulgaria and Romania make up the second group. The third group consists of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus -three post-Soviet countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). An interesting question is if any significant systematic differences in political attitudes and regime support may be observed between and/or within these groups of countries.
The paper breaks down in three broad sections. In the first part, a framework for the operationalisation and analysis of political support will be introduced. The second part consists of a descriptive comparative analysis of regime support, utilising indicators of citizens' perceptions of the political and economic situation. This task is undertaken in an effort to explore general patterns and variations in public regime support. In the third section, the determinants of specific and diffuse regime support will be investigated. However, this analysis should above all be viewed as a first attempt to map out differences and similarities in regime support within this relatively diverse set of countries. Thus, the main aim is more descriptive than explanatory in character.
The attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation
As voters, party members, activists, protesters, political spectators and commentators, ordinary people are the driving force of the democratic process and thus the main source of legitimacy in any democratic regime. However, mainstream theories of democratic transition and consolidation have, to a large extent, tended to downplay the important role of ordinary citizens in their efforts to explain why some democracies become consolidated, while others are unstable, or even regress into authoritarianism. The fate of democracy in newly democratised countries has traditionally mainly been seen as an effect of skilful institutional engineering, elite behaviour and structural conditions. First and foremost, this has come to be the dominant perspective within the field of 'transitology', i.e. the body of research trying to explain transitions from different kinds of authoritarian regimes to democracy (cf. O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Huntington 1991) . Scholars that have pointed their attention towards the consolidation of democracy have to some extent come to employ a somewhat broader approach, widening the scope of explanatory factors, which also led to a certain extent of conceptual confusion due to multiple and conflicting definitions and measures (Munck 2001, 126) . Although the field of democratisation studies has had its main focus on elite politics and institutional engineering, the last decade has generated some important contributions emphasising the importance of mass public attitudes and support in analyses of democratic consolidation (cf. Schedler 2001).
For some scholars, genuine, non-instrumental support for democracy by citizens as well as elites constitutes the most important element of democratic consolidation (cf. Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999; Linde 2004; Dalton 2006 ). This conviction is backed by substantial empirical evidence. As Andreas Schedler has noted, no democracy embedded in a 'democratic consensus' has yet broken down. On the other hand, a substantial number of democracies have survived despite low levels of public support (Schedler 2001, 75) . If democratic consolidation is essentially a question of democratic survival, or avoiding democratic breakdown -the kind of 'negative' notion of democratic consolidation originally used by 'consolidologists' (Schedler 1998; Munck 2001 ) -then we are well advised to take public perceptions about the likelihood of democratic survival into account. In fact, perceptions about the uncertainty of the future have been included in some definitions of democratic consolidation. For example, Valenzuela argues that consolidation 'reaches closure...when major political actors as well as the public at large expect the democratic regime to last well into the foreseeable future ' (1992, 70) . Perceptions and expectations may have a causal impact on consolidation, because social expectations often have a selfreinforcing dimension. It could therefore be reasonable to expect that a new democratic regime will endure if the elites and the public expect it to (Schedler 2001, 78) . Thus, in our analysis of regime support, we will add indicators on future expectations of regime survival to the usual set of survey items on support for democracy and its alternative.
Regime support -conceptualisation and operationalisation
In empirical investigations of a phenomenon such as political support, we have to make complex choices about how we link the concept to observations. Essentially, we are connecting ideas with facts. Operationalising theoretically grounded concepts is indeed bound to raise questions about measurement validity, i.e. to which extent the observations we make capture the ideas contained in the concept of interest. The central question, then, is if we are measuring what we intend to measure (Adcock and Collier 2001) . However, the background concept in this analysis -political support -is too fuzzy and broad to be investigated empirically in itself. In order to empirically measure support, we have to systematise the concept into an explicit definition, which may be operationalised into empirical indicators that we might use for scoring of cases (Adcock and Collier 2001, 531) .
The background concept
Political support is a concept with many possible meanings and, accordingly, a wide variety of definitions can be found in the literature. One of the most frequently used definitions is provided by David Easton, who defines support as 'an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favourably or unfavourably, positively or negatively' (Easton 1975, 436) . In the field of comparative politics, research on political support has been closely connected with research on political attitudes and political culture. Almond and Verba (1963) referred to political attitudes as the political culture of a nation. Political culture includes everything from beliefs in the legitimacy of the political system to attitudes towards the appropriateness of political input structures, government policies, and the role of the individual in the political process. The most important of these attitudes is system affect, i.e. a generalised feeling towards the political system, which is socialised early in life. System affect represents a positive attitude towards the political system that is relatively independent of the performance of the current government. Thus, affective feelings towards the political system could be seen as the main source of legitimacy of the democratic regime (Dalton 2006, 247) .
The distinction between generalised attitudes towards the political system as a whole and evaluations of the current government and specific political actors is of significant importance for empirical analyses of support. As David Easton (1965 Easton ( , 1975 has emphasised, it is important to distinguish between two different kinds of support. The first type -specific support -may be described as a response to, or an evaluation of, specific political actors. It is directed towards the decisions, policies, actions or the general style of these actors, and unless the citizens see their behaviour as appropriate, specific support cannot be generated. Thus, it has to do with explicit evaluations of political actors and institutions (cf. Dalton 2004, 8) .
Diffuse support, on the other hand, refers to evaluations of what an object is, or represents, i.e. the general meaning it has for a person, rather than what it does. Thus, it has to do with the type of affective feelings described above (cf. Dalton 2004, 8) . In fact, it could be described as a reservoir, or a legitimacy capital (cf. Lipset 1959; Dalton 1999, 59 ), of favourable attitudes that makes members of the society accept policies which they in fact are opposed to. In the short run, the diffuse support should not be affected by the effects of daily system outputs and the public's evaluations of it. However, in the long run, diffuse support is built on a record of acknowledged output performance, or 'system outputs', i.e. on a history of positive specific support. It is important to note that 'system outputs' are not only economic in nature, for example in terms of positive economic growth and expanded social welfare. The regime's capacity to maintain order, to maintain the rule of law, and respect human rights and democratic principles is also crucial for the creation of a reserve of generalised support. The underlying idea, then, is that successful political and economic development generates a reservoir of goodwill (diffuse support), which may be used tackle minor setbacks in the regime's ability to produce desirable outputs. Thus, there is a close connection between the two types of support (Linde and Ekman 2003, 405-406) .
The distinction between specific and diffuse support is essential in understanding the importance of public attitudes toward the political process and the political regime. To survive, democratic political systems have to enjoy support from its citizens. At the same time, since all governments from time to time fail to live up to public expectations, short-term failures to satisfy public demands must not totally erode the diffuse support for the regime as such. For example, an individual may be very dissatisfied with the performance of the current government and do all that he or she can to remove that particular government from power, thus demonstrating low, or negative, specific support. However, this individual does not have to believe that the whole political system and its underlying values are inappropriate. If the struggle to remove the governing party from power takes place within the democratic framework, this individual expresses diffuse support for the political regime (Linde 2004, 74-75) .
A multi-dimensional operational definition of support
Having argued that political support is a complex and multi-dimensional concept, how do we operationalise it to be useful in empirical analyses drawing on survey data? As Dalton has noted, the theoretical distinctions between different levels and objects of political support have often been blurred or ignored in research on democratic confidence and institutional trust. Another problem is that the theoretical significance of public opinion findings is very uncertain because the wording of the survey questions used is often ambiguous (Dalton 2004, 5; Linde and Ekman 2003) .
Here, we will take David Easton's (1965; 1975) model of political support as a starting point. Easton makes a distinction between support for three different objects of support: the political community, the regime, and political authorities. Support for the political community indicates a basic attachment or sense of belonging to a political system in broad terms.
Support for the regime refers to the citizens' attitudes towards the constitutional order of a country. The political authorities are those individuals who hold positions of political authority, i.e. the incumbents of office such as the president, the prime minister and political leaders. Although the strength of this model lies in its dimensionality, additional modification of the categories is necessary, since there are significant theoretical and empirical nuances within different parts of the regime. It is not unlikely at all that an individual is highly supportive of the underlying principles of the democratic regime, but at the same time remains highly critical of the actual performance of the democratic government. People also seem to direct their support to some institutions, while remain critical toward others. Lack of confidence in political parties does not necessarily entail low confidence in courts and the police (Norris 1999a, 9) .
One solution to overcome this analytical shortcoming is provided by Pippa Norris (1999a). Norris 'unpacks' Easton's object of the regime into three different objects of support:
regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions. Thus, the result is a five-fold framework, ranging from the most diffuse support for the political community to the most specific type of support for political actors. Figure 1 presents the different objects of support together with examples of survey indicators that might be used to operationalise the different types of support.
For our purposes, the most crucial distinction is the one between 'regime principles' and 'regime performance'. This distinction is made to account for the difference between support for democracy as an underlying principle for the political system (diffuse regime support or affective beliefs), and evaluations of the actual performance of the political system at a given point in time (specific regime support or evaluative beliefs) (cf. Dalton 1999, 58-59) . Due to the scope of this paper, the main focus will be on these two types of support. The main concern will thus be to examine levels of 'diffuse' support for regime principles and 'specific' support for regime performance within our sample of post-communist countries. Sources: Linde and Ekman (2003) ; Norris (1999a, 10-12) .
Figure 1. Objects and levels of political support

Diffuse support: Competition between regimes
Diffuse regime support is connected to citizens' feelings towards the principles that constitute the foundation of the political regime. In this paper, our main concern is the principle of having a democratic regime, i.e. support for democratic regime principles (cf. Table 1 ). On the most abstract level, this type of support is connected to the dimension of attitudinal consolidation of democracy. For example, authors such as Linz and Stepan (1996) and Diamond (1999) argue that for democracy to be considered consolidated, a strong majority of the citizens must embrace the notion that democracy is the most appropriate way to govern the country, or, frankly put, that democracy is the least bad form of government (cf. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998) . Thus, here we are interested in the public's attitudes toward the underlying principles of the regime.
Support for democracy as a system of government
There are a lot of indicators of support for regime principles in the available surveys. One of the most frequently used survey questions asks the respondents whether they believe that democracy is the best form of government compared to all other alternatives. The first column in Table 1 Rose (2005, 68) . Question: 'With which of the following statements do you agree most? a) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; b) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; c) For people like me, it doesn't matter whether we have a democratic of nondemocratic regime'; d) Don't know'. Don't know not shown in the table.
Looking at the individual countries, no particular pattern emerges. The low levels of democratic support (below 50 per cent) in the new EU member states of Slovakia, Poland and Estonia may seem quite surprising. However, the country that clearly stands out in this regard is Russia, where only 25 per cent of the respondents see democracy as the best regime alternative. In general, there has been a dramatic decrease in this regard. When polled by the European Values Study (EVS) in 1999, an average of 85 per cent of the respondents agreed with the following statement: 'Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government' (Linde and Ekman 2006) . In 1999, levels of support for democracy exceeded 90 per cent in five countries. In the EVS survey too, the lowest level of support was found in Russia, but then democracy was preferred by a total of 62 per cent. However, some caution is called for when comparing different surveys. In the EVS, the question about democracy as the best form of government is asked differently in that the respondents do not have the option of 'agreeing most' with different alternatives, as in the NEB survey. In the EVS the respondents only have the option to agree or not agree with the statement that democracy is better than any other form of government.
The data in Table 1 Furthermore, approximately one out of five respondents believes that a non-democratic government could be justified under some circumstances. This belief could be interpreted as a kind of 'conditional', or instrumental, support for democracy, which assumes that while democracy may work satisfactorily in some circumstances it is not always the ideal option, and therefore a non-democratic regime may sometimes be the preferred option. A person could be ready to support democracy as long as things work well in the country, but is nonetheless ready to withdraw this support in times of trouble and hardship if one believes that an authoritarian regime would be more effective (cf. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, 102; Diamond 1999, 169) .
However, when contrasting these findings with equivalent data from the Eurobarometer and World Values Survey for Western Europe, the result definitely looks gloomier from a democratic point of view. In the 15 'old' EU member states, between 65 (Ireland) and 93 per cent (Sweden) of the citizens agree that democracy is the best form of government when also having the 'conditional' and 'apathy' alternatives to choose from (Dalton 1999, 70 ; see also Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, 103) . The data thus suggest that there is a greater deal of variation in support for democracy among the established West European democracies and the post-communist countries, than between the two groups of post-communist countries. In fact, the only post-communist country that stands out is Russia, where only one fourth of the respondents prefer democracy, while more than 42 per cent see an authoritarian regime as a feasible option. In all other countries, a relative preference for democracy seems to be the prevailing sentiment among the populations.
If not democracy, then what?
In this part we take the plausible assumption that all assessments of support for democracy must ultimately rely on comparison as our point of departure. In reality, support for democracy is relative in the sense that democracy could very well be supported not necessarily as an ideal form of government, but nevertheless as preferable to its known alternatives (Diamond 1999, 168-169; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998) . In a recently democratised country, the new regime must time and again prove itself to be a better option than the possible alternatives. (Linde 2004, 214) . In the non-EU countries, the support for a return to Soviet-style government is somewhat stronger, but is still rejected by a large majority in all countries except Russia, where 41 per cent of the respondents state that they would like to see a return to the old order.
The second alternative -replacing parliamentary democracy with a strong leader who can quickly decide everything -is also widely rejected, but it nevertheless comes forward as a more popular option than a return to communism. A great deal of variation among the EU countries is noticeable. In Poland, almost half of the respondents report that they would Linde (2004, 233) . Question: 'Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had. Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think?' The respondents are asked to agree or disagree with the following alternatives: a) A return to communist rule; b) Best to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader who can quickly decide everything; c) The army should govern the country. Entries are percentages of 'strongly agree' and 'somewhat agree'. * In Belarus, the question was asked in reverse, as follows: 'It would be better if parliamentary rule replaced a strong leader'. The result shown has been coded to ensure comparability with the other countries (see Rose 2005, 52) . ** Comparable trend data not available.
It is worth noting the relatively high levels of support for this regime alternative in the Baltic States, where the kind of 'communist nostalgia' which can be found in some of the other countries instead manifests itself as something that may be described as 'strong man nostalgia'.
3 This may not come as a surprise, considering the Baltic States' status as postSoviet states, where the communist era to a large extent could be looked upon as first and foremost a period of occupation by an external power. Therefore, in the Baltic States, a possible explanation of the relatively widespread presence of non-democratic sentiments of this kind could be that national independence is not associated with democracy, but with the charismatic authoritarian nation-builders of the inter-war period -Konstantic Päts, Karlis
Ulmanis and Antanas Smetona (cf. Gerner and Hedlund 1993, 57-58; Linde 2004, 223-226) .
In general, support for strong man rule is stronger in the non-EU post-Soviet states. Here, the most interesting observation is the very high level of support for strong man rule in
Belarus. However, with regard to the nature of the Belarusian regime, this figure could be interpreted in different ways (also see the note below Table 2 ). On the one hand, it could be an indication of support for Lukashenka's authoritarian rule. On the other hand, it is possible that it is an effect of the repressive nature of that regime. People living under a harsh dictatorship might be less willing to criticize the regime than is normally the case in surveys.
A simple inspection of This hypothesis -that a new democracy may be preferred as the lesser evil -has been labelled the 'Churchill hypothesis' (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Mishler and Rose 1999 ).
The last column in Table 2 shows the share of respondents that rejects all three nondemocratic regime alternatives, and within parentheses the changes since 2001. Measured this way, democracy seems to enjoy strong support in the EU countries. In all these countries, except for Poland, more than 60 per cent of the respondents reject the non-democratic alternatives. On average, almost 7 out of 10 citizens prefer democracy over its alternatives. In the non-EU countries, the pattern is more diverse. In Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, the alternatives to democracy are rejected by a majority of the citizens. In Russia and Belarus, the majority prefer at least one of the non-democratic regime alternatives. In most countries (for which we have trend data), the share of respondents rejecting the alternatives has increased.
The empirical evidence in Table 2 suggest that the 'Churchill hypothesis' has bearing on the relatively new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, at least in the countries that are, or are soon to be, members of the EU (cf. Linde 2004) .
Beliefs in the future of democracy
Traditionally, survey research on regime support has focused on normative attitudes towards democracy, i.e. questions about regime legitimacy. The most common way to do this is to ask people whether they like democracy or not (cf. Table 1 ). Empirical analyses of the public's cognitive perceptions, i.e. expectations of regime continuity, have been more unusual. There are, however, good reasons to include this dimension in analyses of democratic consolidation.
Expectations about the future often have a self-reinforcing dimension. In short, if large segments of the public and the elites believe that democracy is here to stay, the likelihood of democratic survival increases (cf. Schedler 2001; Haerpfer 2002, 26) . Table 3 presents the shares of respondents stating that they think it is unlikely that democracy would be replaced by a non-democratic regime. Haerpfer (2002, 26) . Question: 'How likely do you think it is that in the next few years: a) The communist system would be restored?; b) A strong leader would replace government by an elected parliament?; c) The army would govern the country?' Response categories: 'very likely', 'maybe', 'not likely at all' and 'not very likely'. The table aggregates the last two categories. * Because of the nature of the regime in Belarus, the question was asked in reverse, as follows: 'Parliament would replace a strong leader'. The result shown has been coded to ensure comparability with the other countries (see Rose 2005, 54) .
A cursory look at the figures reveals that in the eight EU countries the levels of confidence in the future of democracy are very high. Approximately nine out of ten respondents in these countries believe that it is unlikely that democracy would be abolished and replaced by a nondemocratic regime. As we could see in Table 2 , the option of having a strong leader instead of parliamentary democracy enjoys a fair share of normative support in most countries.
However, people expressing that kind of support do not seem to actually believe that their wishes will become a reality in the near future. Looking at the available data over time, it is clear that as time has gone by, citizens' confidence in the future of democracy has increased.
On average, the share of respondents convinced of a democratic future in the EU countries has increased by 25 percentage units since 1994. In the non-EU countries, the confidence in a democratic future is not that clear-cut. In Ukraine, almost half of the respondents do not see the future of representative democracy as the only thinkable scenario. A regression to communist rule, or that the army would rule the country in the future, is however deemed as unlikely by a strong majority. It could be worth noting that in Ukraine, the survey way conducted in February 2005, i.e. after the 'Orange revolution'.
When observing the empirical evidence over time, it seems that there is a strong connection between the democratic persistence and confidence in the future of the democratic regime. The longer democracy survives and citizens learn to cope with the system, the stronger their confidence in the future of democracy. There is a great deal of variation between the countries when it comes to satisfaction with democracy (Table 4) . Within the group of EU member states, the levels of satisfaction vary between 30 per cent in Slovakia and 68 per cent in Slovenia, which is the only country where a majority of the respondents claim to be satisfied with the way democracy works. The mean for all eight countries is 41 per cent, which is one percentage point lower than in 2001. In 2001, the corresponding figure for the 15 'old' EU member states was 59 per cent, ranging from 37 per cent in Portugal to 87 per cent in Denmark (Eurobarometer 56 ).
Specific regime support: Dissatisfied democrats
Looking at the countries outside the EU, it is interesting to note that in Belarus no less than 40 per cent of the respondents claim to be satisfied with the way democracy works. This might seem quite puzzling, given the fact that the Belarusian regime does not qualify as a democracy by any standards. It may seem pointless to ask these kinds of questions in a nondemocratic setting, but it might say something about regime support in a broader perspective.
Maybe the answers should be interpreted as an indication on the level of popular support for Lukashenka's authoritarian regime, considering the fact that the level of satisfaction with democracy has doubled since 1996 (Klingemann 1999, 50) . Linde (2004) . Questions: 1) 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in our country?'; 2) 'How much respect do you think this country's government has for individual human rights (A lot of respect, some respect, not much respect, or no respect at all)?'; 3) As for your own household, how do you rate its economic situation today (Very satisfactory, fairly satisfactory, not very satisfactory, or very unsatisfactory)?'; 4) 'How widespread do you think bribe-taking and corruption are in this country (Very few public officials corrupt, less than half are corrupt, most public officials are engaged in it, almost all public officials are engaged in it)?' The table aggregates the two 'positive' answers. * Comparable trend data not available.
Evaluations of regime performance is not only depending on what the regime delivers to its citizen, but also on what the regime refrains from doing in terms of unwanted action on the behalf of the state. One indicator of this kind of support is the publics' perceptions of whether the regime pays respect to human right or not (cf. Linde and Ekman 2003; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999) . Satisfaction with the regime's respect for human rights is higher than satisfaction with democracy. Among the EU countries, only in Lithuania and the Czech Republic do a small majority of the respondents express discontent with the human rights situation. An average of 57 per cent evaluates the human rights situation in positive terms, compared to only 39 per cent in the countries outside the EU. However, maybe the most interesting question when it comes to the human rights issue concerns citizens' relative evaluation of the current human rights situation in relation to the human rights record of the former regime. Empirical research has shown that in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary a strong majority (85 per cent) believe that the new regime shows better respect for individual human rights. This could be compared to the corresponding figures for Russia and Ukraine, where only half of the population felt the same way (Miller, White and Heywood 1998, 96) . This is also reflected in the current levels of satisfaction with the human rights situation in these countries, where only around 30 per cent of the respondents view the situation in favourable terms. Ironically, the level of satisfaction with human rights in Belarus is among the highest in the whole set of countries (62 per cent).
Regime support is not only about political matters. Earlier studies of regime support have shown that public support for regime performance is to a large extent also depending on economic conditions. As Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer have put it: 'individuals who feel good about the economy are expected to have a positive outlook, and those who feel bad to be negative ' (1998, 164) . In general, post-communist citizens are quite dissatisfied with their household economic situation, although the share of satisfied citizens has increased somewhat since 2001 in all countries for which we have data. The dissatisfaction with the microeconomic situation is also reflected in public attitudes towards the old economic system on the macro-level. In all countries but the Czech Republic, a majority of respondents evaluate the old planned economy in favourable terms (Rose 2005, 36) . The positive evaluation of the old economic system is hardly surprising considering the fact that only 23 per cent of the citizens in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus report that the income from the main job or pension is not enough to buy what they really need. The corresponding figure for the rest of the countries is 35 per cent. A large majority in all countries state that they are coping thanks to a multiply of resources (Rose 2005, 26-27) .
Corruption is often put forth as one of the biggest threats to the rule of law, and, therefore, to democracy itself (Berglund, Aarebrot, Vogt and Karasimeonov 2001, 119) . Earlier research on democratising countries suggests that citizens give considerable weight to problems of corruption when forming judgements about the political regime (Diamond 1999, 91-93) .
From this point of view, post-communist citizens' evaluation of the corruptness of public officials is quite worrying. In our group of EU countries, only 32 per cent in average believe that few or less than half of the public officials are corrupt. In the non-EU countries the equivalent figure is only 15 per cent.
Who supports?
So far, we have seen that post-communist citizens, in general, express relatively high levels of diffuse regime support as measured by survey data. However, the indicators of specific regime support, or evaluations of the actual functioning of the system, testify to a relatively widespread public discontent with the performance of the current regime. Still, a majority of the citizens reject non-democratic alternatives and thus in the end support the principles of the regime. This is in line with our analytical framework, which emphasises the importance of distinguishing between different objects of support. The average post-communist citizen seems to be relatively dissatisfied with the performance of the current regime, while at the same time perceiving this regime as better, or less worse, than the alternatives. Thus, an
interesting question is what factors that determine regime support. Is diffuse and specific support driven by the same factors? Table 5 presents a regression model with an index of specific regime support as the dependent variable. The index consists of the four items in Table 4 . The independent variables include standard socio-demographic background variables together with measures on political attitudes, economic evaluation, and social trust. The model explains 27 per cent of the variance in support for regime performance. Although this leaves a lot to be explained by other factors, this is a fairly good result in a social science context. The analysis shows clearly that economics matters when it comes to specific support. When controlling for social background, there is a strong relationship between citizens' evaluation of the current economic system and specific regime support. People who believe that the current economic system will improve in the next five years also tend to evaluate the performance of the current regime in a positive way.
The analysis also shows that positive evaluations of the former economic system have a negative impact on specific support. Support for democratic regime principles, in terms of rejection of non-democratic alternatives and a feeling of increased possibilities to way what you think, also comes out as a strong predictor of specific support. Furthermore, citizens expressing higher levels of interpersonal trust -both generalised trust in most people in country and particularised trust in people they know -also tend to show higher levels of support. This indication -that generalised social trust seems to be connected to specific support -confirms the results from an earlier analysis of the correlates of institutional trust .
Looking at the social background variables, the level of personal income has the strongest explanatory power, while the other variables have weak and/or insignificant effects on specific support. All in all, positive normative judgments about the new regime's underlying principles, such as greater freedom of speech and market economy, social trust and rejection of non-democratic alternatives are associated with more positive evaluations of the actual functioning of the regime, i.e. higher levels of specific regime support. Furthermore, additional regression models on individual countries also suggest that the results in Table 5 represent a general pattern.
We now turn to the issue of diffuse support. Table 6 presents a regression model with an index of diffuse regime support as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the same as in Table 5 , except that in this model, the reject non-democratic alternatives item has been replaced by satisfaction with the current regime's respect for human rights. A simple inspection of the model gives at hand that also diffuse support is to a large extent associated with evaluations of the economic system. There is a strong negative relationship between positive evaluation of the communist economic system and support for the democratic regime.
And, logically, positive beliefs in the future development of the current market economic system have a significant positive impact on diffuse support. The 'political' variables included in the model -satisfaction with human rights and evaluation of increased freedom of speechalso show significant impact on the dependent variable. Social trust shows limited importance when it comes to diffuse support. Particularised trust -in people known by the respondent -has significant impact on diffuse support. Generalised social trust, however, does not seem to have any effect on diffuse regime support. This result may seem quite surprising and is at odds with the body of literature arguing convincingly that social trust is one of the most important factors contributing to political trust, democratic legitimacy and stability (cf. Inglehart 1997; Putnam 1993) . Our results suggest than generalised interpersonal trust is a much stronger predictor of trust in political institutions and the performance of the regime, i.e. specific support, than of the diffuse regime support investigated here, i.e. democratic legitimacy. Social background is more important when it comes to diffuse support than for specific support. Level of education and income come out as relatively strong and significant predictors. Gender and age have a significantly stronger impact in this model than it had in the model of specific support. Younger men tend to have higher levels of diffuse regime support.
The same model was specified and tested on each country, and the overall pattern was similar: rating of socialist economy and perception of increased freedom are the strongest predictors in all countries except for Poland, where satisfaction with the human rights situation is the most important explanatory factor.
Concluding remarks
The empirical evidence presented in the first part of this paper suggest that post-communist citizens in general express relatively high levels of diffuse regime support, i.e. they are supportive towards the underlying principles of the new regime. In all countries, except for Russia and Belarus, 50 per cent or more of the respondents reject possible non-democratic regime alternatives. And, in general, the trajectories of regime support (as measured by rejection of non-democratic alternatives and confidence in the future of democracy) have been increasing.
When observing ordinary citizens' evaluation of the current regime's actual performance, however, a fair share of public discontent is undoubtedly noticeable. Slovenia is the only country where a majority claims to be satisfied with the way democracy works. Perceptions of the current regime's human rights record are more positive, but indicate that large segments of the publics are dissatisfied with the way their individual rights are treated by the regime. A large majority of post-communist citizens report dissatisfaction with the micro-economic situation. Distrust in public officials due to problems with corruption is also widespread throughout Eastern Europe. In all countries, a majority state that more than half of the public officials are corrupt. No clear-cut pattern of dissatisfaction is visible, but discontent is most widespread in Russia and Ukraine (while the Belarusians seem quite content with the situation), followed by Bulgaria and Romania. In the group of EU member states, levels of satisfaction with regime performance are somewhat higher, but still far from those of the 'old' EU countries. Trend data suggest, however, that levels of satisfaction are moving upwards in most of these countries. In the last part, possible determinants of regime support were analysed. The analyses of specific and diffuse regime support show that both types of support are affected by similar factors. Specific regime support is, when controlling for social background, determined mainly by normative economic and political attitudes together with level of income. Apart from income, social background as such has no significant explanatory power. Diffuse regime support is strongly influenced by the evaluation of the former communist economy, future expectations about the current economic system and income, as well as judgements about the increased freedoms under the current regime. There is also a strong association between diffuse regime support and education. Highly educated people are more likely to see democracy as a better option than the non-democratic alternatives, and also tend to believe that the democratic regime will endure in the future. So, what are the consequences for democratic consolidation in these countries? If we apply a definition of attitudinal consolidation where non-instrumental, intrinsic support for the principles of democracy, rejection of non-democratic alternatives and strong beliefs in a democratic future are essential features, then democracy must be considered attitudinally consolidated in the eight EU member states and also Bulgaria and Romania. These countries are characterised by relatively high levels of democratic legitimacy and confidence in the future of democracy, even if support and confidence do not match perfectly. The positive development in this regard might be an effect of the membership in the European Union, which could very well be seen as a guarantor of democracy and market economy. The Russian public is more doubtful about democracy, even on the principle dimension. Only 25 per cent prefer democracy to any other kind of government, while 42 per cent see an authoritarian government as preferable under some circumstances. When asked about alternative regimes, almost 60 per cent of the Russian respondents state that they would prefer at least one non-democratic alternative, and a majority sees a non-democratic regime as likely in the near future. Ukraine falls somewhere in between, with a small majority endorsing democracy as the best regime and rejecting non-democratic alternatives. However, more than 40 per cent of the respondents report that they do not perceive a situation when parliamentary democracy is replaced by a strong leader as unlikely in the next few years.
This analysis, based on recent survey data, testifies to a significant discrepancy between specific and diffuse regime support. The average post-communist citizen express quite strong support for the principles of democracy while, at the same time, feeling discontent with the way the new regime performs. What about this discrepancy? Does it constitute a problem when it comes to the legitimacy of the new regime? In the literature two main interpretations, or hypotheses, can be singled out. The first one is rather pessimistic and argues that low levels of specific support may spill over and affect the level of diffuse support, thus eventually drying out the legitimacy reservoir (cf. Lipset 1959 , Easton 1965 . The more optimistic interpretation would argue that the gap between diffuse and specific support found in this study is nothing but normal in democracies. We are now observing the same type of 'critical citizens' in post-communist Europe that has been around for a long time in Western Europe (cf. Norris 1999b; Klingemann 1999; Dalton 2004; Linde 2004) . These citizens could even constitute an asset to democracy if they decide to work for change within the rules of the democratic framework, thus contributing to democratic consolidation. Both interpretations deserve to be empirically tested in the future.
